An axiomatic approach to composite solutions

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Dinko Dimitrov (dinko.dimitrov@mx.uni-saarland.de) and Claus-Jochen Haake
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No 385, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from  Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: We investigate a situation in which gains from cooperation are represented by a cooperative TU-game and a solution proposes a division of coalitional worths. In addition, asymmetries among players outside the game are captured by a vector of exogenous weights. If a solution measures players' payoffs inherent in the game, and a coalition has formed, then the question is how to measure players' overall payoffs in that coalition. For this we introduce the notion of a composite solution. We provide an axiomatic characterization of a specific composite solution, in which exogenous weights enter in a proportional fashion.

Keywords: Composite solution; External weights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08-15
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