Author
Aidan Vining (vining@sfu.ca) and John Richards
Resources Policy, 2016, vol. 49, issue C, 358-367
Abstract: In Canada, indigenous communities have strengthened de jure and de facto rights over the last generation, thereby enabling them to realize substantial resource rents and other economic development income. Canadian First Nations (the preferred name for most indigenous communities) have in recent years established over 200 economic development corporations, many of them hybrid organizations partnering with non-Aboriginal resource corporations. We analyze the challenges of institutional design of such hybrids, employing the concept of fractionalized ownership. We discuss principal-agent problems at two levels: First Nation members relative to their leaders, and leaders relative to managers of economic development corporations. We also analyze principal-to-principal problems that arise with multiple owners. Using a sample of Ontario First Nation communities, the empirical section analyzes the impact of own-source revenue (much of it derived from resource projects) on a socio-economic index. The main conclusion is that incremental own-source revenue improves community socio-economic conditions, but only modestly.
Keywords: First Nations; Economic development corporations; Resource rents; Principal-agent problems; Principal–principal problems; Rent dissipation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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https://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeejrpoli/v_3a49_3ay_3a2016_3ai_3ac_3ap_3a358-367.htm
Aidan Vining (vining@sfu.ca) and John Richards
Resources Policy, 2016, vol. 49, issue C, 358-367
Abstract: In Canada, indigenous communities have strengthened de jure and de facto rights over the last generation, thereby enabling them to realize substantial resource rents and other economic development income. Canadian First Nations (the preferred name for most indigenous communities) have in recent years established over 200 economic development corporations, many of them hybrid organizations partnering with non-Aboriginal resource corporations. We analyze the challenges of institutional design of such hybrids, employing the concept of fractionalized ownership. We discuss principal-agent problems at two levels: First Nation members relative to their leaders, and leaders relative to managers of economic development corporations. We also analyze principal-to-principal problems that arise with multiple owners. Using a sample of Ontario First Nation communities, the empirical section analyzes the impact of own-source revenue (much of it derived from resource projects) on a socio-economic index. The main conclusion is that incremental own-source revenue improves community socio-economic conditions, but only modestly.
Keywords: First Nations; Economic development corporations; Resource rents; Principal-agent problems; Principal–principal problems; Rent dissipation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301420716302082
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jrpoli:v:49:y:2016:i:c:p:358-367
Access Statistics for this article
Resources Policy is currently edited by R. G. Eggert
More articles in Resources Policy from Elsevier
Series data maintained by Dana Niculescu (repec@elsevier.com).
For further details logon website :
https://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeejrpoli/v_3a49_3ay_3a2016_3ai_3ac_3ap_3a358-367.htm
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