Corruption and Deforestation: A Differential Game Model

Author

Cassandro Mendes (cassandromendes@hotmail.com), Sabino Porto Juniorand Fabricio Tourruc?o

Business and Economic Research, 2016, vol. 6, issue 1, pages 481-491

Abstract: Deforestation is a global issue and recently has been given much attention by governments and international institutions. The present paper aims to present a simple theoretical model on the relationship between corruption and deforestation. To model such relationship, we used differential games. Our model suggests that corruption increases deforestation. Moreover, the salary paid in the public sector may be an important tool to fight deforestation in development countries.

Keywords: Deforestation; Corruption; Differential game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: R00 Z0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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