Empirical linkages between devolved tenure systems and forest conditions: Primary evidence

Author

Runsheng Yin, Leo Zulu, Jiaguo Qi, Mark Freudenberger and Matthew Sommerville

Forest Policy and Economics, 2016, vol. 73, issue C, pages 277-285

Abstract: Empirical research on the relationship between devolved tenure and forest condition has unfolded along two distinct but complementary lines of inquiry. They include local-level examinations of closely coupled forest conditions and such institutional variables as rulemaking, enforcement, and monitoring; and regional-level analysis of resource conditions against an array of institutional and other variables, including different tenure systems or scenarios of before vs. after devolution or with vs. without. Large advances have made in defining the relevant variables and testing the causality. While some studies suggest that forest tenure reform and institutional change can lead to improved forest condition, it remains too soon to draw a strong and general conclusion on the direct causal linkage between devolved forest rights and improved forest condition. Knowledge gaps exist in terms of the quantity and quality of the evidence.

Keywords: Forest devolution; Tenure reform; Community-based management; Forest condition; Impact evaluation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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