Author
Yi Xie, Peichen Gong, Xiao Han and Yali Wen
Journal of Forest Economics, 2014, vol. 20, issue 2, pages 126-140
Abstract: China implemented a new round of collective forestland tenure reform during 2003–2013. In this reform, forestland owned by villages or township collective organizations were divided into a great number of small plots and allocated to member households of the collectives. A widespread concern about the reform is that parcelization of forestland might limit farmers’ incentives to invest in forest management. This paper examines the factors affecting farmers’ investment in forest management using household data collected in four provinces in 2010. The results show that the intensity of a household's investment in forest management is negatively affected by its nonfarm income and the average size of forest plots, but positively affected by the easiness in obtaining loan and the technical assistance the household receives. We argue that the counterintuitive effect of nonfarm income on investment intensity is due to the increasing marginal cost of own labor input. The effects of forest plot size and easiness in obtaining loan suggest that households have limited amount of capital to invest in forest management. Because of this constraint, parcelization of forestland resulted from the recent reform has not yet caused any reduction of the intensity of investment in forest management.
Keywords: Land tenure reform; Collective forest; Forest management; Forest policy; Double hurdle model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q23 N50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Journal of Forest Economics is currently edited by P. Gong and R. Brännlund
More articles in Journal of Forest Economics from Elsevier
Series data maintained by Shamier, Wendy (repec@elsevier.com).
For further details log on website :
http://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeeforeco/v_3a20_3ay_3a2014_3ai_3a2_3ap_3a126-140.htm
Yi Xie, Peichen Gong, Xiao Han and Yali Wen
Journal of Forest Economics, 2014, vol. 20, issue 2, pages 126-140
Abstract: China implemented a new round of collective forestland tenure reform during 2003–2013. In this reform, forestland owned by villages or township collective organizations were divided into a great number of small plots and allocated to member households of the collectives. A widespread concern about the reform is that parcelization of forestland might limit farmers’ incentives to invest in forest management. This paper examines the factors affecting farmers’ investment in forest management using household data collected in four provinces in 2010. The results show that the intensity of a household's investment in forest management is negatively affected by its nonfarm income and the average size of forest plots, but positively affected by the easiness in obtaining loan and the technical assistance the household receives. We argue that the counterintuitive effect of nonfarm income on investment intensity is due to the increasing marginal cost of own labor input. The effects of forest plot size and easiness in obtaining loan suggest that households have limited amount of capital to invest in forest management. Because of this constraint, parcelization of forestland resulted from the recent reform has not yet caused any reduction of the intensity of investment in forest management.
Keywords: Land tenure reform; Collective forest; Forest management; Forest policy; Double hurdle model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q23 N50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1104689914000142
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text
Persistent link:http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:foreco:v:20:y:2014:i:2:p:126-140
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/701775/bibliographic
http://www.elsevier. ... 701775/bibliographic
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Forest Economics is currently edited by P. Gong and R. Brännlund
More articles in Journal of Forest Economics from Elsevier
Series data maintained by Shamier, Wendy (repec@elsevier.com).
For further details log on website :
http://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeeforeco/v_3a20_3ay_3a2014_3ai_3a2_3ap_3a126-140.htm
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