Exchanging fertilizer for votes?

Author

Nina Bruvik Westberg (nina.westberg@nmbu.no)
Additional contact information

No 12-2015, Working Paper Series from  School of Economics and Business, Norwegian University of Life Sciences

Abstract: Several countries have made targeted input subsidy programs an integral part of their policies for improving food security. Given the programs' often centralized structure and targeting of private goods nation-wide, these may also serve as instruments for garnering electoral support. I investigate to what extent distributions from such a program was altered leading up to the 2009 Malawian presidential election, comparing the allocations of fertilizervouchers in the last season prior to this relative to other seasons. I do not nd evidence of targeting at the incumbent's core supporters, whereas swing supporters receive on average more fertilizer vouchers in the 2008/09 season relative to other seasons. This increase comes at the expense of the main opponents' core supporters, whom receive on average fewer vouchers. These ndings add to the broader set of questions of whether targeted subsidies is the right approach for improving food security, and if so how.

Keywords: fertilizer subsidies; elections; Malawi (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H53 O13 Q18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-cdm and nep-pol
Date: 2015-06-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.nmbu.no/sites/default/files/pdfattachments/hh_wp_12_2015_2.pdf(application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:nlsseb:2015_012

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series from  School of Economics and Business, Norwegian University of Life Sciences Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, P.O. Box 5003, NO-1432 Aas, Norway. Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Frode Alfnes (frode.alfnes@nmbu.no).

For further details log on website :
http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/hhsnlsseb/2015_5f012.htm